We develop a new method for defending deep neural networks against attacks using adversarial dual network learning with randomized nonlinear image transform. We introduce a randomized nonlinear transform to disturb and partially destroy the sophisticated pattern of attack noise. We then design a generative cleaning network to recover the original image content damaged by this nonlinear transform and remove residual attack noise. We also construct a detector network which serves as the dual network for the target classifier to be defended, being able to detect patterns of attack noise. The generative cleaning network and detector network are jointly trained using adversarial learning, fighting against each other to minimize both perceptual loss and adversarial loss. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves the state-of-art by large margins in both white-box and black-box attacks. It significantly improves the classification accuracy for white-box attacks upon the second best method by more than 30% on the SVHN dataset and more than 14% on the challenging CIFAR-10 dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Deep neural networks are sensitive to adversarial attacks [1] . Very small changes of the input image can fool the state-of-art classifier with very high success probabilities. During the past few years, a number of methods have been developed to construct adversarial samples to attack the deep neural networks, including fast gradient sign (FGS) method [2] , Jacobian-based saliency map attack (J-BSMA) [3] , and projected gradient descent (PGD) attack [4] , [5] . Adversarial attack methods are able to manipulate the perturbations so that the target classifier can be forced to produce a specific output [6] . It has also been demonstrated that different classifiers can be attacked by the same adversarial perturbations [1] . The fragility of deep neural networks and the availability of these powerful attacking methods present an urgent need for effective defense methods.
Efficient defense algorithms aim to improve the robustness of different networks. During the past few year, a number of deep neural network defense methods have been developed, including adversarial training [1] , [4] , defensive distillation [7] - [9] , Magnet [10] and featuring The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Guitao Cao .
squeezing [11] , [12] . It has been recognized that these methods are not capable of defending the network against different attacking algorithms [13] . Recent studies explore new frameworks for network defense. For example, defense-GAN [13] attempted to approximate the attacked image using a clean image produced by generative adversarial networks (GANs) [14] . Reference [15] trained a generative network to produce adversarial noises that can fool the discriminative network based on a min-max game.
In this paper, we explore a new approach to defending deep neural networks using adversarial dual network learning with randomized nonlinear image transform. We recognize that the attack noise is not random. It has sophisticated patterns. The attack methods often generate attack noise patterns by exploring the specific structure or classification behavior of the target deep neural network so that the small noise at the input layer can accumulate along the network inference layers, finally exceed the decision threshold at the output layer, and result in false decision. On the other hand, we know a well-trained deep neural networks are robust to random noise [16] , such as small white noise. So, the key issue in network defense is to randomize or destroy the sophisticated pattern of the attack noise while recovering the original image content.
Motivated by this observation, we first introduce a randomized nonlinear transform to disturb and partially destroy the sophisticated pattern of attack noise. We then design a generative cleaning network to recover the original image content damaged by this nonlinear transform and remove residual attack noise. We also construct a detector network which serves as the dual network for the target classifier to be defended. The generative cleaning network and detector network are jointly trained using adversarial learning so that the detector network cannot detect the existence of attack noise pattern in the images recovered by the generative cleaning network. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves the state-of-art by large margins in both white-box and black-box attacks. It significantly improves the classification accuracy for white-box attacks upon the second best method by more than 30% on the SVHN dataset from 46.90% to 76.67%, and more than 14% on the challenging CIFAR-10 dataset from 60.15% to 74.64%. The proposed dual network structure also provides unique capabilities in practice to defend extreme high-iteration PGD white-box attacks without the need to modify the target classifier.
The major contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. (1) We have proposed a new and unique approach for deep neural network defense using adversarial dual network learning with randomized nonlinear transform of the attacked images. (2) We have formulated and solved the problem by exploring a unique generative adversarial network (GAN) method which couples the detector (discriminative) network with the original classifier network and considers both perceptual loss and adversarial loss. (3) Our new method has significantly improved the performance of the state-of-the-art methods in the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. The proposed method is presented in Section 3. Experimental results and performance comparisons with existing methods are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attack and defense algorithms for deep neural networks are often tightly coupled. In this section, we review related work on attack algorithms that aim to generate adversarial examples to fool neural networks and defense algorithms that improve the robustness of networks under different attacks.
A. ATTACK METHODS
Attack methods can be divided into two threat models: white-box attacks and black-box attacks. The white-box attacker has full access to the classifier network parameters, network architecture, and weights. The black-box attacker has no knowledge of or access to the target network.
For white-box attack, a simple and fast approach called Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method has been developed by Goodfellow et al. [2] . Given an image x and its corresponding true label y, the attack sets the perturbation threshold :
This approach uses the sign of the gradient at each pixel to determine the direction of changing pixel value. Basic Iterative Method (BIM) is an improved version of the FGS attack method. Carlini and Wagner [8] designed an optimization-based attack method, called Carlini-Wagner (C&W) attack, which is able to fool the target network with the smallest perturbation. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [17] proposed an approach to generate universal adversarial perturbations that can attack all natural images. Baluja et al. [18] , [19] trained a generative adversarial network (GAN) [14] to generate perturbations. It has been recognized in [20] , [21] that the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) is the strongest attacker among all attacks, which can be viewed as a multi-step variant of FGS k [5] .
x k+1
where δ is the step size, and k is the number of PGD steps. Athalye et al. [22] introduced a method, called Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA), to attack networks where gradients are not available.
where g(x) is the preprocessor, f (x) is the pretrained classifier. This approach approximate the preprocessor's derivative as the derivative of the pretrained classifier to compute gradients. It is able to successfully attack most state-of-the-arts defense methods. For black-box attacks, the attacker has no knowledge about target classifier. Papernot et al. [23] introduced the first framework of black-box attack using substitute models. Adversarial examples generated by different network architectures are often being mis-classified by the targeted classifier [1] . Dong et al. [24] proposed a momentum-based iterative algorithms to improve the transferability of adversarial examples. Xie et al. [25] boosted the transferability of adversarial examples by creating diverse input patterns. Recently, many methods have been proposed for attack object detection and semantic segmentation networks [26] . For example, Thys et al. [27] developed a method to learn a patch that can be applied to an object to fool the YOLO [28] object detector and classifier. [1] , [2] . [5] suggested that training with adversarial examples generated by PGD improves the robustness. Reference [10] proposed a method, called MagNet, which detects the perturbations and then reshape Recently, there are some defense methods based on GANs have been developed. Samangouei et al. [13] projected the adversarial examples into a trained generative adversarial network (GAN) to approximate the input using generated clean image with multiple iterations:
B. DEFENSE METHODS

Several approaches have recently been proposed for defending both white-box attacks and black-box attacks. Adversarial training defends various attacks by training the target model with adversarial examples
where G(·) is the generator of GAN, z is the adversarial inputs. Wang et al. [15] , [18] generated adversarial perturbations using GANs, jointly trained a classifier to adjust the output of generative networks based on a min-max game. This method can be considered as an extension of adversarial training. There are several defense methods based on input transformations. Guo et al. [29] proposed a set of image transformations to defend the adversarial examples, including image cropping and re-scaling, bit-depth reduction, and JPEG compression. Xie et al. [30] proposed to defend against adversarial examples by adding a randomization layer, which randomly re-scales the image and then randomly zero-pads the image. Jia et al. [31] proposed an image compression method, called ComDefend, to defend adversarial examples. Xie et al. [21] suggested perturbations on images lead to noise in the feature map. They introduced a feature denoising method for defending PGD white-box attacks. Reference [32] proposed an efficient approach that bring adversarial samples onto the natural image manifold, restoring classification towards correct classes. Reference [33] maximally separated the polytopes of classes by force to learn distinct and distant decision regions for each classes.
Our proposed defense method is also related to GANs and image transformations. But, compared to existing methods, our method is unique in the following aspects: (1) We introduce a special layer called quantized nonlinear transform, into the generative cleaning network to destroy the sophisticated noise pattern of adversarial attacks. (2) Unlike the GAN-based methods in [15] , [18] which aim to approximate input noise image using images generated by the GAN over multiple iterations, our generative cleaning network aims to reconstruct the image content damaged by quantized nonlinear transform. (3) Our method does not need to modify the target network to be protected. 
Compute the adversarial loss
Update the parameters θ, φ with a GAN-like min-max procedure. 8 Return parameters θ, φ III. METHOD OVERVIEW Figure 1 provides an overview of the proposed method. The attacked image x * is first processed by a randomized nonlinear transform, aiming to disturb and partially destroy the attack noise. In this work, we construct this transform with a linear transform T , followed by a random quantization and an inverse transform T −1 . The transformed image is denoted byx. The generative cleaning network G θ takes the transformed imagex as input and produces a recovered imagex, aiming to remove the residual attack noise left by the nonlinear transform and recover the original image content damaged by the attack noise and nonlinear transform. During network inference, this recovered imagex will be passed to the target classifier C α for image classification or recognition. To successfully learn the generative cleaning network G θ , we construct a detector network D φ , which serves as the dual network for the target classifier network C α . The task of D φ is to determine if the input image is clean or being attacked. In our proposed method, the generative cleaning network G θ and the detector network D φ are jointly trained through adversarial learning: the G θ network is trying to recover the imagex so that D φ cannot detect any attack noise in it. In the following sections, we will explain the proposed method in more detail.
A. RANDOMIZED NONLINEAR IMAGE TRANSFORM
The randomized nonlinear image transform aims to disturb and partially destroy the sophisticated pattern of the attack noise. It is designed to be random so that the attack method cannot predict and learn its behavior during white-box attacks. In this work, we propose to construct such a transform using a linear transform T , followed by a random quantizer RQ and an inverse transform T −1 . For the linear transform, we use the discrete cosine transform (DCT) [34] which has been in JPEG image compression [35] . Specifically, we partition the input image into blocks of M × M . The original image block is denoted by X * B = [x * nk ] 1≤n,k≤M . The output blockX B = [x ij ] 1≤i,j≤M after DCT transform is given bŷ
with C i = 1/ √ 2 for i = 0, and C i = 1 for i = 0. After transform, we will quantize the transform coefficientx ij as follows
where q is the quantization parameter and r ij is a random number within the scaling range of [R L , R U ]. For example, in our experiments, we set R L = 0.5 and R U = 2.0 to achieve a dynamic scaling range of 4 for the quantization parameter. Certainly, this DCT transform can be replaced with other invertible transform, such as discrete wavelet transform [36] .
B. ADVERSARIAL DUAL NETWORK LEARNING
In our DualDefense design, the generative cleaning network D φ and the detector network D φ are trained against each other, just like the existing generative adversarial networks (GAN). D φ is a binary classifier to detect if the input image is clean or not. During the initial phase of training, D φ is trained with the clean images and their attacked versions generated by existing attack methods. The goal of the generative cleaning network G θ is two-fold: (1) first, it needs to successfully remove the residual attack noise in the transformed imagex so that the noise cannot be detected by the detector network D φ . (2) Second, it needs to make sure that the original image content is largely recovered. To achieve the above two goals, we formulate the following generative loss function for training the generative cleaning network G θ
where L P is perceptual loss and L A is the adversarial loss.
To define the perceptual loss L P , the L 2 -norm between the recovered imagex and the original image x o is often used [37] . The adversarial loss L A aims to recover images that detected as clean by the detector network D φ . In this work, we observe that the small adversarial perturbation often leads to very substantial noise in the feature map of the network [21] . Motivated by this, we use a pre-trained VGG-19 network, denoted by F β to generate visual features for the recovered imagex and the original image x o , and use their feature difference as the perceptual loss L P . Specifically,
The adversarial loss L A aims to train the G θ so that its recovered images are to be detected as clean by the detector network D φ . It is formulated as
Here, [·, ·] represents the cross-entropy between the output generated by the generative network and the target label I clean for clean images. r (x * ) represents the randomized nonlinear transform discussed in the previous section. E represents the statistical expectation. Following the GAN method [14] , we train our discriminative network D φ , along with the generative cleaning network G θ , to optimize the following min-max loss function:
Here, o and * represent the clean and attacked images of the training dataset. The goal of generative model G θ is to fool the discriminator D φ that is trained to distinguish adversarial images from clean images. With this framework, our generator learns to recover images that are highly similar to clean images and difficult to be detected by D φ . The detector network D φ acts as a dual network for the original classifier C α . Cascaded with the generative cleaning network G φ , it will guide the training of G φ using back propagation of gradients from its own network, aiming to minimize the above loss function. In our DualDefense design, during the adversarial learning process, the target classifier C α is called to determine if the recovered imagex is clean or not, as illustrated in Figure 1 . If it is clean, it is added back into the clean training sample set o on the fly to enhance the learning process. A summary of the proposed algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implement and evaluate our DualDefense method based on existing procedures and protocols with generally used attack methods, including the FGS method [2] and PGD method [5] . Madry et al. [5] suggests that the PGD attack is one of the most powerful attack methods due to its multiple-order attack process and the capability to defend against PGD attacks implies the successful survival from many other first order attacks. We implement our method using Pytorch and build on open-source attack framework AdverTorch [38] . The target classifier and detector network are based on ResNet-18 [39] . We attempt to reconstruct the adversarial samples using a convolutional auto-encoder.
A. DEFENSE AGAINST WHITE-BOX ATTACKS
In this section, we present defense results against FGS and PGD white-box attacks, where the attacker has access to full information of the defense system. In white-box experiments, the attackers can back-propagate through the full end-to-end system to create adversarial perturbations.
1) RESULTS ON THE CIFAR-10 DATASET
Following [20] and [15] , the FGS and PGD white-box attackers generate adversarial perturbations within a range of = 8/255. In addition, we set the step size of PGD to be = 1/255 with 10 attack iterations. Table 1 shows the defense results. We compare our method with four state-ofthe-art methods under FGS and PGD attacks. It should be noted that ComDefend [31] and PixelDefend [40] did not provide results for the PGD attack. The PGD attack is very powerful. It can totally fail the classifier with a resulting accuracy of 0% if no defense is applied. From the table, we can see that our method outperforms the existing method by a large margin. For the FGS attack, we improve upon the state-of-the-art method ComDefend by 5.97%. For the PGD attack, we improve the performance by more than 14%.
2) RESULTS ON THE SVHN DATASET
The Street View House Numbers (SVHN) dataset [42] is a dataset of about 200K street numbers, along with bounding boxes for individual digits. In total, it has about 600K digits. For the SVHN dataset, we set the FGS attack with a range of = 12/255. We compare the defense performance of FGS attack with two state-of-art M-PGD [5] and ALP [20] methods. We did not include the comparison on the other two methods since they did not provide results with FGS attacks but PGD attacks. From Table 2 , we can see that our algorithm outperforms the second best adversarial network [15] algorithm by more than 4.25%. Following the procedure in [20] , we set the magnitude of the PGD attack to be = 12/255 with a step size of = 3/255 and 10 iterations. We set the quantization parameter q to be 8. Performance comparison results are summarized in Table 2 . We can see that our method dramatically improves the performance, outperforming the second best ALP method [20] by about 30%.
B. DEFENSE AGAINST BLACK-BOX ATTACKS
The previous section showed the results of defending white-box attacks where the attacker has full access to the whole end-to-end system. For black-box attack, the attacker has no knowledge about the target classifier or network, including the network structure and parameters of classifier. We generate the black-box adversarial examples using FGS and PGD attacks on a substitute model [23] . The substitute model is trained in the same way as the target classifier with a different network structure. Table 3 shows the performance of our defense mechanism under back-box attacks on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The substitute model is trained with Resnet-34 [39] and adversarial examples are constructed with = 8/256. We observe that the target classifier is much less sensitive to adversarial examples generated by FGS and PGD black-box attacks than the white-box ones. But the powerful PGD attack is still able to decrease the overall classification accuracy to a very low level, 38.71%. We compare our method with the Adersarial-PGD [5] and Adversarial Network [15] methods. We include these two because they are the only ones that provide performance results on CIFAR-10 with FGS black-box attacks. From the table, we can see our algorithm improves the accuracy by 5.4% over the state-of-the-art Adversarial Network method for the FGS attack. For the PGD attack, our method improves the accuracy by 6.9%.
1) RESULTS ON THE CIFAR-10 DATASET
2) RESULTS ON THE SVHN DATASET
We also perform experiments of defending black-box attacks on the SVHN dataset. Table 4 summarizes our experimental results with FGS and PGD attacks and provides the comparisons with existing methods. Our approach outperforms the state-of-art methods by 2.55% for the FGS attacks and 5.37% for the PGD attacks.
C. ABLATION STUDIES AND ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide in-depth ablation study results of our algorithm to further understand its capability. We also demonstrate that our network is able to defend strong adversarial attacks.
1) DEFENSE AGAINST LARGE-ITERATION PGD ATTACKS
The impact of the white-box PGD attacks increases with its number of iterations since it accesses the network and performs gradient back-propagation more times to force the network towards wrong classification output. Following the protocol of ALP [20] , we evaluate the capacity of our defense method against different numbers of PGD white-box attack iterations. We also test our method with the different quantization parameter, q. The curve with q = 8 in the left plot of Figure 2 is our baseline result on the SVHN dataset reported in the above section. For reference, we also include the performance of the ALP method in the bottom-left corner of the figure, which is the previous state-of-art method for network defense. Similar to [21] , we consider the PGD attack with large numbers of iterations ranging from 10 to 100. We set its total range of perturbation as = 16/255 and per-step epsilon as 1/255, which is a more challenging setting for defense methods. We can see that our method is able to successfully defend white-box PGD attacks with large number of iterations and largely maintain the performance. The impact of attack becomes relatively stable after 50 iterations. We can also see that if we increase the quantization parameter q from 8 to 12, the performance improves more, to nearly 80%.
2) ANALYZE THE IMPACT OF THE QUANTIZATION PARAMETER
Our method has two major components, the randomized nonlinear transform (RNT) and the generative cleaning network. We notice that the quantization parameter plays an important role in the defense. Figure 2(right) shows the defense performance (classification accuray after defense) of our method on the SVHN dataset with white-box PGD attacks. We can see that the quantization step size within the range of 8 to 12 yields the best performance. Small quantization parameters do not provide efficient defense since the randomized nonlinear transform is not able to disturb and destroy the attack noise pattern. However, when the quantization parameter becomes too large, it will damage the original image content too much which cannot be recovered by the subsequent generative cleaning network.
D. MORE DETAILS ON THE ALGORITHM TRAINING AND DEFENSE PROCESS
In Figure 3 (left), we plot the loss function of the generative cleaning network (generative loss) and the loss function of the detector network (discriminative loss). We can see that they converge quickly to steady states. In Figure 3 (right), we plot the classification accuracy of our defense method and the total loss of our network at different epochs of the training process of the SVHN dataset. In Figure 4 , we show sample images from the CIFAR-10 when our method is applied. The first row is the clean image without attacks. The second row is attacked image. The third row is the image after randomized nonlinear transform (RNT). The last row is after the generative clean network (labeled as RNT+GAN), which is the final output of our defense method. We can see that our algorithm is able to remove the attack noise and largely recover the original image content.
Furthermore, [43] - [45] shows the values of these new networks for improving our performance. We will incorporate these network structures in our defense framework to increase the robustness.
V. CONCLUSION
We have developed a new method for defending deep neural networks against attacks using adversarial dual network learning with randomized nonlinear image transform.
We first introduced a randomized nonlinear image transform to disturb and partially destroy the attack noise. This transform is randomized so that it cannot be directly learned by the attack method during white-box attacks. We designed a generative cleaning network to recover the original image while cleaning up the residual attack noise. We developed a detector network, which serves as the dual network of the target classifier network to be defended, to detect if the image is clean or being attacked. This detector network and the generative cleaning network are jointly trained with adversarial learning so that the detector network cannot find any attack noise in the output image of generative cleaning network. Our extensive experimental results demonstrated that our approach improves the state-of-art by large margins in both white-box and black-box attacks. It dramatically improves the classification accuracy upon the second best method more than 30% on the SVHN dataset and more than 14% on the challenging CIFAR-10 dataset.
